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Abstract
Low corporate taxes can help attract new rms. This is the main mechanism under-
pinning the standard race-to-the-bottomview of tax competition. A recent theoretical
literature has qualied this view by formalizing the argument that agglomeration forces
can reduce rms sensitivity to tax di¤erentials across locations. We test this proposi-
tion using data on rm startups across Swiss municipalities. We nd that, on average,
high corporate income taxes do deter new rms, but that this relationship is signicantly
weaker in the most spatially concentrated sectors. Location choices of rms in sectors
with an agglomeration intensity at the twentieth percentile of the sample distribution are
estimated to be twice as responsive to a given di¤erence in local corporate tax burdens
as rms in sectors with an agglomeration intensity at the eightieth percentile. Hence, our
analysis conrms the theoretical prediction: agglomeration economies can neutralize the
impact of tax di¤erentials on rmslocation choices.
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1 Introduction
According to the standard model of tax competition, increasing mobility of rms induces a
race to the bottom in corporate taxes.1 Recent theoretical work has fundamentally questioned
the relevance of this scenario. In most new economic geographymodels, the strength of
geographical agglomeration forces increases as goods and factors become more mobile. As a
result, somewhat paradoxically, the scope for attracting rms through scal inducements could
in fact shrink as technological and administrative obstacles to rm mobility are reduced. The
existence of agglomeration forces could thus allow governments to continue to tax corporate
income even once capital has in principle become highly mobile.
We provide an empirical verication of the hypothesis that agglomeration forces can o¤set
di¤erences in corporate taxes as a determinant of rm location. Estimating location choice
models for rm start-ups across Swiss municipalities, we nd that high corporate taxes are
indeed a deterrent to rm location, but that this deterrent e¤ect is signicantly weaker for
sectors that are more spatially clustered. Hence, agglomeration economies - be they due to
externalities or to spatially concentrated endowments - can reduce the ability (and incentive)
of jurisdictions to compete for rms via strategically low tax rates.
These results are based on Poisson regressions derived from rm-level prot functions in a
location choice model. We rst estimate a baseline modelof rmslocation choices, in which
we introduce an explicit interaction term between municipal corporate taxes and a measure
of sector-level agglomeration. In an alternative approach, we then estimate a specic model
that is formally derived from a model of spatial demand and supply conditions. In that
model, the relative e¤ect of taxes versus agglomeration forces features implicitly rather than
via an explicit interaction term. We minimize simultaneity problems between taxes and rm
location by using sector-level counts of new rms as the dependent variable, and municipal
corporate taxes which apply identically to rms across all sectors as the independent variable.
Unobserved sector characteristics are controlled for via xed e¤ects, and the qualitative results
are shown to be robust across a range of specications and at di¤erent levels of sectoral
aggregation.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the relevant literature. Section
3 presents the two estimable models. Our empirical setting and data set are described in
1For a comprehensive review of this literature, see Wilson (1999).
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Section 4. Estimation results are reported in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature background
The implications of agglomeration economies for strategic tax setting among jurisdictions
competing for mobile tax bases have been studied in a number of theoretical contributions,
including Ludema and Wooton (2000), Kind, Midelfart-Knarvik and Schjelderup (2000), An-
dersson and Forslid (2003), Baldwin and Krugman (2004), and Borck and Püger (2006).2
The key insight of this literature is that agglomeration forces make the world lumpy: when
capital (or any other relevant production factor) is mobile and trade costs are su¢ ciently low,
agglomeration forces lead to spatial concentrations of rms that cannot be dislodged with
small tax inducements.3 In fact, agglomeration externalities create rents that can in principle
be taxed by the jurisdiction that hosts the agglomeration.4
New economic geography models typically feature a single increasing-returns sector, the
intensity of whose agglomeration forces varies (typically non-monotonically) with trade costs.
Where agglomeration forces are strongest (i.e. at intermediate trade costs), the probability
that the increasing-returns sector completely agglomerates in one region is highest, and the
sensitivity to tax di¤erentials is smallest.5 The greater is a sectors observed spatial concen-
tration, the larger, on average, are the underlying agglomeration economies, and the lower
should be the sectors locational sensitivity to tax di¤erentials.
Empirically, there is considerable evidence to show that rm location is sensitive to di¤er-
ences in corporate taxes, across a range of methodological approaches.6 In the terminology of
2See Baldwin, Forslid, Martin, Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud (2003, ch. 15, 16) for a comprehensive
overview.
3Conversely, Ottaviano and van Ypersele (2005) show that in the presence of agglomeration economies, tax
competition can be second-best welfare-enhancing, as it may mitigate a tendency towards excessive spatial
concentration of rms.
4Due to non-monotonicity, new economic geography models also accommodate congurations where ag-
glomeration economies in fact add to the sensitivity of rm location to tax di¤erentials, and thus exacerbate
the intensity of tax competition (Baldwin et al., 2003, Result 15.8). We focus on the congurations featuring
established agglomerations, which is where these models imply qualitatively novel predictions for tax policy.
Furthermore, Burbidge and Cu¤ (2005) and Fernandez (2005) study tax competition in models featuring in-
creasing returns to scale that are external to rms, with rms operating under perfect competition. In these
models, individual rm mobility is not constrained by agglomeration economies, and governments may compete
even more vigorously to attract rms than in the standard tax competition model. Krogstrup (2008) shows
that for tax competition to be intensied, external agglomeration economies must be relatively weak, in the
sense that they are outweighed by dispersion forces that stabilize the overall spatial allocation of activity. Our
working hypothesis is that agglomeration economies are su¢ ciently internalized by rms that they a¤ect rms
locational sensitivity to tax di¤erentials.
5More precisely, in the standard core-peripherymodel the range of tax di¤erentials that will not dislodge
a given spatial allocation of rms is largest where agglomeration forces are strongest.
6See, e.g., Hines (1999) for a survey, and de Mooij and Ederveen (2003) for a meta-analysis.
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Borck and Püger (2006, p. 663), the delocation elasticityis widely found to be negative.
Starting with Carlton (1983), numerous studies have estimated conditional logit models
of rmslocation choices.7 The conditional logit model has the advantage of being formally
derived from a rms stochastic prot function, but it becomes computationally demanding
for estimation of models with individual data and large numbers of locational alternatives.
Papke (1991) therefore suggests that location choice could also be represented by a region-level
count model, such that estimation is based on maximum likelihood with an assumed Poisson
distribution.8 The Poisson model is shown by Guimaraes, Figueiredo and Woodward (2003)
to be formally equivalent to the conditional logit model with grouped data and group-specic
xed e¤ects. We can therefore estimate the conditional logit model via Poisson, taking sectors
as the grouping variable.
To our knowledge, only Devereux, Gri¢ th and Simpson (2007) have previously explored
the impact of agglomeration economies on the sensitivity to local scal incentives of rms
location choices.9 They estimate a conditional logit model of plant location in Great Britain,
including an interaction term of region-level scal incentives with the stock of pre-existing
same-sector plants in the relevant region; and they nd that scal incentives have a greater
impact on attracting plants in regions with large stocks of existing plants. As scal incentives
in British regions are negotiated individually for each proposed new establishment, unob-
served plant-level features might a¤ect both the probability of a plant receiving a grant in a
particular area and the probability of it locating in that area. Since statutory corporate taxes
of Swiss regions are neither rm- nor sector-specic, our empirical setting does not present
the estimation challenge a¤ecting an analysis of the same question based on British regional
grants.
Our analysis is novel in two additional ways, both motivated by a quest to tie our esti-
mations closely to the theory. First, in our baseline specication, we focus on the interaction
7Recent applications include Guimaraes, Figueiredo and Woodward (2000), Figueiredo, Guimaraes and
Woodward (2002), Crozet, Mayer and Mucchielli (2004), Head and Mayer (2004), Strauss-Kahn and Vives
(2005), and Devereux, Gri¢ th and Simpson (2007).
8Count models of rm location have subsequently been estimated by List (2001), Guimaraes, Figueiredo an
Woodward (2004), and Holl (2004).
9We are aware of two other empirical studies that address the link between agglomeration and local taxation.
In an analysis of the determinants of rm births in Catalonia, Solé-Ollé and Jofre-Monseny (2007) estimate
the impact of local taxes with and without including controls for local agglomeration economies. They nd
that without controlling for agglomeration, the estimated e¤ect of local business tax rates on rm births turns
positive, which suggests that these taxes are positively correlated with local agglomeration measures. Charlot
and Paty (2007) report that French municipalities with greater market potentials charge higher local business
tax rates.
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of taxes with a sector -specic measure of agglomeration, in order to capture the essence of
the new economic geography insight on tax competition.10 As long as taxes vary within the
bounds beyond which they would trigger discrete (catastrophic) relocations of mobile sec-
tors, the theory consistently suggests that stronger sector-level agglomeration forces imply a
smaller delocation elasticity.11
Second, in addition to a somewhat ad hoc baseline model similar to those that have
typically been estimated in this literature, we construct a specic modelas a representative
rms prot function that is formally derived from explicitly modeled spatial demand and
supply conditions. The specic model implies that interaction terms on the tax variable are
not in fact warranted, but it still allows us to compute the relative importance of taxes versus
agglomeration forces in determining location choices.
3 Models of location choice
3.1 A baseline model: footloose and latent startups
At the most general level, there are two approaches to modeling the location of new rms.
One approach is to consider an investor who has resolved to set up a rm somewhere among
a given set of locations and then decides which location to pick. We refer to this as the
footloose startupmodel.12 The other approach is to assume that potential entrepreneurs are
spatially immobile and continuously decide whether or not to set up a rm.13 We refer to this
approach as the latent startupmodel. To the empirical researcher, these two approaches are
equivalent in two essential respects: the decision to set up a rm at a particular location is
based in both cases on expected prots, and in both cases expected prots are best modelled
10Devereux et al. (2007), using a location-specic measure, show that it may be cheaper to attract a new plant
to an existing cluster than to a peripheral location. This is an important and evidently policy-relevant result,
but not what the theory necessarily predicts when the economy is in spatial equilibrium. In an interior spatial
equilibrium with no relocation costs, expected prots at the locus of agglomeration (the central location)
and at the periphery are equalized. Whether a given change in scal inducements is then more e¤ective at
attracting rms to a central or to a peripheral location is indeterminate, as it depends on the functional form
of the relationship between real returns and industry shares across locations. In the simulations reported by
Borck and Püger (2006, Fig. 5), a given scal inducement will attract a larger number of rms if o¤ered at
the peripheral location than if o¤ered at the central location.
11 In core-peripherymodels, which, in the absence of taxes, accommodate only perfectly agglomerated or
perfectly dispersed spatial allocations of the mobile sector, marginal variations in relative tax burdens imply
marginal reallocations of that sector among locations in the dispersed equilibrium but have no e¤ect on sectoral
location in the agglomerated equilibrium (see, e.g., Baldwin et al., 2003). In models that accommodate partially
agglomerated congurations even in the absence of taxes, more strongly agglomerated equilibria imply lower
delocation elasticities (Borck and Püger, 2006).
12This approach underlies the empirical literature on location choices using the conditional logit model.
13See, e.g., Becker and Henderson (2000) and Figueiredo et al. (2002).
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as a combination of deterministic components and a stochastic term.
We posit a general prot function for a footloose-startup decision problem, where a rm
has decided to set up a new plant f belonging to sector i and now considers which location j
to choose:
fij = Uij + "fij = 1Tj + 2Ai + 3TjAi + 
0xij + "fij : (1)
Uij summarizes the deterministic part of the prot function that is common to rms of a
particular sector and at a particular location; Tj represents the relevant corporate tax burden
at location j; Ai represents the strength of agglomeration economies in sector i; xij is a vector
of other variables that determine a rms prots in sector i at location j (such as factor
prices, proximity to markets, etc.); 1; 2; 3 and  are coe¢ cients to be estimated; and
"fij is a stochastic error term. Sectorspropensity to agglomerate, Ai, may be determined
by pecuniary and/or technological spillovers, or it may be due to the spatial concentration
of immobile resources that are important to sector i. What matters is that the locational
advantages at the locus of agglomeration are at least partly internalized by rms.
Our interest is in the parameter 3: while we expect the attractiveness of a location j to fall
in the level of its corporate tax burden, implying that 1 should be negative, this sensitivity
should be weaker in sectors that are subject to strong agglomeration forces. A positive 3
would therefore conrm the result of the economic geography literature that agglomeration
forces can o¤set industriessensitivity to tax di¤erentials.
If we treat the location decision problem as one of random prot maximization, rm f will
pick locationm if fim > fij 8 j; j 6= m. As shown by McFadden (1974), the assumption that
"fij has an extreme-value type 1 distribution yields a simple expression for the probability
of choosing location m: pfim = expUfim  (
P
j
expUfij)
 1. If we dene a dummy variable
dfij that equals one if rm f chooses location j and zero otherwise, the log-likelihood of
the conditional logit model becomes: lnLCL =
P
f
P
j
dfij ln pij =
P
i
P
j
nij ln pij , where nij
represents the number of rms in sector i that choose location j.
Guimaraes et al. (2003) have shown that the same log-likelihood, up to a constant, obtains
if one assumes nij to be independently Poisson distributed. Thus, estimates obtained from a
Poisson count regression of nij on all region specic and region-sector specic regressors plus
a set of sector xed e¤ects are equivalent to those obtained from conditional logit estimation.
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Specically, we can rewrite the random prot model (1) equivalently as follows:
E (nij) = ij = exp
 
1Tj + 3TjAi + 
0xij +  0di

; (2)
where nij follows a Poisson distribution and di is a set of sector dummies. The inclusion
of sector dummies forces the control matrix xij to consist exclusively of variables that vary
across locations. The main e¤ect of Ai, 2, is absorbed into the sector xed e¤ects.
The latent-startup model assumes that every location hosts a certain number of immobile
actual and potential new rms (entrepreneurs) per sector. At every point in time, each
potential entrepreneur computes the net present value (NPV) from becoming active and uses
this to decide whether or not to start an actual rm. This yields, for every location-sector
pair, a supply and demand curve for new rms in birth-NPV space. The supply curve, which
rises in NPV, depends primarily on the size of a locations pool of potential entrants. The
demand curve traces how the NPV per rm changes as more rms become active in the same
sector and location, and its position depends on variables such as local factor costs and local
product demand. Total births are then determined by the intersection of these demand and
supply schedules. Becker and Henderson (2000) show that, conditional on standard regularity
conditions, this model leads directly to the Poisson specication (2). By employing Poisson
estimation, we can therefore accommodate both the footloose and the latent startup models
- a considerable advantage given that it would be impossible based on available statistics to
judge which of the two models represents a better approximation of the actual data-generating
process.
3.2 A specic model for footloose startups
While the model of expected prots in equation (1) may be intuitive and general, it is not
rooted in a formal representation of the rms optimization problem. We now derive a prot
function formally, drawing on a simple model proposed by Crozet, Mayer and Mucchielli
(2004). This will lead to a particular specication of the prot function that can be viewed as
an alternative to equation (1), thus o¤ering a complementary framework for the exploration
of our basic research question.
We assume identical consumer preferences across locations j but allow for variations in
income and price elasticities of demand across sectors i. A generalized Cobb-Douglas utility
6
function then implies the following expression for quantity demanded Qij :
Qij =
im
i
j
piij
;
where i is the sectoral expenditure share, mj is relevant income at location j, pij is the
price, i is the income elasticity, and i > 1 is the price elasticity of demand.
Symmetry among rms of any sector at a particular location implies that quantity de-
manded, and thus equilibrium output per rm, are equalized: qij =
Qij
Nij
; where Nij is the
number of active rms in sector i at location j.
Firms are assumed to be price takers in factor markets. Their unit costs are modeled as
follows:
cij =
 
wij
 
1 + twj
wi k 1 + tkjki  rj  1 + trjri N (N+Ai)ij ; (3)
where wij is the wage rate (which may vary across locations and industries), k is the
capital rental price (assumed constant across locations and industries), rj is land rental price
(which may vary across locations), twj is the payroll tax rate (to the extent that it is borne by
employers), tkj is the capital tax rate, t
r
j is the property tax rate, Ai again captures agglom-
eration economies, and the s are parameters. wi , 
k
i , and 
r
i represent input shares of labor,
capital and land. The exponent on Nij , (N + Ai), implies that rms in more agglomerated
sectors will benet more from proximity to own-sector rms than rms in less agglomerated
sectors.
Prots of a representative rm can be written as ij = (1  tj ) (pij   cij) qij , where tj is
the corporate income (i.e. prot) tax rate. Prot maximization with a large number of rms
competing in quantities, and consideration of a multiplicative stochastic term fij , implies
the following rm-level prot function:14
fij =
 
1  tj

im
i
j
 
wij(1 + t
w
j )
wi 1 i k(1 + tkj )ki1 i  rj(1 + trj)ri 1 i
N
((N+Ai)(i 1) 2)
ij fij :
14See Crozet et al. (2004) for the derivation.
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In logs, this becomes:
ln(fij) = ln(1  tj ) + lni + i lnmj (4)
+((1  i)wi ) lnwij + ((1  i)wi ) ln(1 + twj )
+((1  i)ki ) ln k + ((1  i)ki ) ln(1 + tkj )
+ ((1  i) ri ) ln rj + ((1  i)ri ) ln(1 + trj)
+
  
N +Ai

(i   1)  2

lnNij
+ ln fij :
We can thus write the following estimable equation:
ln(fij) = 0 + 1i + 2 ln(1  tj ) + 3i lnwij + 4i ln rj + 5i ln(1 + tkj ) (5)
+6i ln(1 + t
w
j ) + 7i lnNij + 8i (Ai  lnNij) + 9i lnmj + ln fij ;
where the i are absorbed by sector xed e¤ects (1i), and property taxes t
r
j are dropped
as they do not play a role in our empirical setting.15 If we assume that lnfij follows an i.i.d.
extreme-value type 1 distribution, equation (5) leads to a standard conditional logit model
and can be estimated, mutatis mutandis, via a Poisson count model analogous to (2).16
The principal di¤erence between the baseline model (2) and the specic model (5) is that
the latter no longer features an explicit interaction term between the corporate income tax
burden and sectoral agglomeration intensity. This stems from the simple fact that a given
statutory tax rate on prots reduces prots exactly proportionally irrespective of any sectoral
15The prot function (4) implies that 2 = 1. This restriction, however, cannot be tested, because the
coe¢ cients of a multinomial choice model are identied only up to a multiplicative scale factor. Strictly, (4)
also implies that 3i = 6i, i.e. that the e¤ect of a percentage change in wages is equivalent to that of a
percentage change in the tax on wages. We shall not impose this restriction, because (a) we observe taxes
on personal income (whose incidence on rmswage bills we cannot measure) and (b) our data for wages and
for personal income taxes are at di¤erent spatial scales. Moreover, for expositional simplicity we shall report
results with 5i, 6i, 7i, and 8i each constrained to be equal across sectors, i.e. we assume the e¤ects of
taxes on factor inputs and the main e¤ect of Nij (which we shall represent by the empirical variable sector
proximity) to be the same across sectors. To the extent that they are possible, estimations with sector-level
e¤ects of these variables yield qualitatively equivalent results to those reported below. Given the very limited
time variation in our data, separate identication of 7i, and 8i is not feasible.
16Silva and Tenreyro (2006) show that the Poisson estimator is particularly well suited to log-linear regression
specications that are derived from multiplicative models with potentially heteroskedastic error terms.
8
or locational specicities. Hence, we shall compute an indirect tax-versus-agglomeration ef-
fectfor the specic model, based on the magnitude of the estimated tax sensitivity parameter
2 relative to the magnitude of the estimated agglomeration sensitivity parameters 7 and
8.
3.3 Estimation issues
3.3.1 Scaling
In estimating our models (2) and (5), we need to take account of the fact that real-world
locations come in di¤erent geographic sizes, giving them di¤erent probabilities of attracting
or generating a certain number of new rms even once their purely economic characteristics
are accounted for. Failure to control for size di¤erences could thus lead to omitted-variable
bias.
We can think of our locations j as consisting of Lj equally sized lots` 2 Lj . Character-
istics of individual lots are only observed (or are only relevant) at the level of locations.
Assume a conditional logit model at the level of lots. The prot function for rm f
associated with lot ` in location j (suppressing industry-level notation) is given by f` =
Ufj + "f`, where "f` is independent across f and ` and follows an extreme-value type 1
distribution. Note that the deterministic part Ufj is equal across lots within location j. Then
the probability that rm f chooses a lot in location m is given by
pfm =
X
`2Lm
p` =
X
`2Lm
expUfmP
` expUfj
=
Lm expUfmP
j Lj expUfj
=
exp (Uf`m + lnLm)P
j exp (Ufj + lnLj)
:
This is equivalent to a conditional logit model at the level of locations with prot function
fj = Ufj+ lnLj+"fj , where "fj is independent across f and j and follows an extreme-value
type 1 distribution. The number of lots Lj in location j can be computed as economically
usable land area Sj divided by lot area s. The prot function at the level of locations then
becomes
fj = ~Ufj + lnSj + "fj ; (6)
where the constant lot size only a¤ects the intercept of the deterministic part ~Ufj =
Ufj   lns.
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We therefore include usable land area as a control variable in all our estimated regressions.
Taken literally, expression (6) suggests that the coe¢ cient on log area should be equal to one.
We shall test the robustness of our results to the formal imposition of this restriction in the
specic model.
3.3.2 Unobserved location-specic e¤ects
In the context of location choice modelling, Poisson estimation allows the researcher to adhere
rigorously to the random prot-function model. It does not, however, relax the independence
of irrelevant alternatives(IIA) assumption, which arguably represents the major drawback
of the conditional logit approach. IIA implies that stochastic terms are independent across
locations. This assumption is violated if there are relevant location-specic characteristics that
are spatially correlated but unobserved by the econometrician. A useful palliative is to include
location-specic xed e¤ects, controlling for all unobserved location-specic characteristics
(Guimaraes et al., 2004). Our baseline model (2) thus becomes:
E (nij) = ij = exp
 
3TjAi + 
0xij +  0di + 0dj

; (7)
where dj is a set of location dummies. This approach no longer allows identication of
coe¢ cients on purely location-specic characteristics such as Tj . Since we are interested in
this e¤ect as well as in coe¢ cients on certain other certain purely location-specic variables,
we estimate our models both with and without location-specic xed e¤ects, taking the former
as robustness tests for the latter.
3.3.3 Overdispersion and excess zeroes
The estimable Poisson model is formally derived from the underlying prot functions. This
establishes a direct link between theory and empirics. The Poisson model implies that the
expected count, ij , is equal to the variance of nij . This is typically a strong assumption
in empirical applications, as the variance often exceeds the expected count (overdispersion),
and as economic data often feature a larger number of zero observations than that implied
by the Poisson distribution.17 We address these issues in two ways. For the standard xed-
17 In our data, the share of zero observations ranges from 73.3 percent at the two-digit level of sectoral
aggregation to 89.7 percent at the four-digit level.
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e¤ects panel Poisson estimates we additionally report robust standard errors, and we estimate
zero-inated panel Poisson.18
4 The empirical setting
4.1 Local taxation in Switzerland
We base our estimations on data for Switzerland. For a number of reasons, the Swiss scal
system provides an ideal laboratory in which to examine our research question.
Swiss sub-federal jurisdictions enjoy almost complete autonomy in the determination of
their tax rates, and, as a consequence, we observe large variations in tax burdens even within
the small area covered by Switzerland.19 The Swiss federation consists of three government
layers (federal, cantonal and municipal), with each jurisdictional level collecting a roughly
similar share of total tax revenue.
In the Swiss scal system, corporate taxation is mainly the remit of sub-federal jurisdic-
tions. Cantons and municipalities collect around 65 percent of the total tax income raised
on corporate income and capital, the remaining 35 being raised by the federal government.
Hence, di¤erences in corporate taxes across cantons and municipalities matter, and they are
large. Figure 1 illustrates this point for consolidated cantonal-plus-municipal corporate in-
come taxes on prots of a representative rm with a 2 percent return on capital: the highest
tax rate, at 14.1 percent, is almost seven times higher than the lowest rate, at 2.1 percent.
Another advantage of the Swiss system is that corporate taxation is based on legally bind-
ing statutory rates that depend solely on rmsprotability and capital base. Statutory rates
apply identically across sectors and rms. Di¤erences in tax burdens across municipalities and
cantons can therefore be considered as exogenously given from the point of view of individual
rms. Since identical tax treatment applies across sectors, and our data allow for analysis at
the level of narrow sectors, we can also abstract from the possibility that the intensity of spa-
tial concentration in certain sectors could be inuenced by the level and spatial distribution
18See Winkelmann (2000) on these approaches to estimation and inference with panel count data, and List
(2001) for an application of the zero-inated Poisson estimator to models of location choice. Since the ZIP
estimator breaks the formal link between the theoretical prot function and the empirical model, we consider
it as a sensitivity check on the Poisson regressions. On robust standard errors in panel Poisson models, see
Wooldridge (1999)
19Switzerland has an area of 41,285 square kilometres and a population of 7.5 million. It therefore covers
about twice the area, and hosts roughly the same population, as the US state of Massachusetts.
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of corporate tax burdens.20
4.2 Data sources
We draw on data from three main sources.
First, the Swiss Federal Statistical O¢ ce has collected information on every newly created
rm annually since 1999.21 The main use of this data set is as the source of new rm counts
per municipality and economic sector (nij), our dependent variable. We use data for the
years 1999-2002. This database o¤ers information on the municipality in which the new rm
is located and on the rms main sector of activity in terms of the two-, three- and four-
digit sectors of the European NACE classication system.22 The data set records as new
rms all market-oriented business entities that have been founded in the year concerned and
are operating for at least 20 hours per week. New entities created by mergers, takeovers
or breakups are not counted. A foreign rms rst Swiss branch, however, counts as a new
rm. Observed rm start-ups undoubtedly represent a mixture of births through resident
entrepreneurs best modelled by the latent-startup approach and of births by non-resident
(Swiss or foreign) investors best modelled by the footloose-startup approach.
Our second source of data is the multiannual census of all rms located in Switzerland,
also carried out by the Federal Statistical O¢ ce. We use data for the surveys of 1998 and
2001, containing information on location, sector of activity and employment, to construct our
agglomeration variables.
Finally, we have assembled a municipality-level dataset on local taxes and other control
variables from a variety of sources.23 We use these data for our measures of corporate and
income tax burdens, factor prices, public expenditure, and proximity to markets. The data
were collected for 1998 and 2001, covering the 213 largest municipalities. The mean population
of our sample municipalities is 17,367, for a mean total area of 20.2 square kilometers.24
20For models of endogenous agglomeration, driven in part by taxation patterns, see e.g. Ottaviano and van
Ypersele (2005), and Hauer and Wooton (2007).
21The statistical o¢ ces title for this project is Unternehmensdemograe(UDEMO).
22We retain only sectors that pertain to the private sector. Furthermore, sectors for which no rm births
are observed in either year are dropped from the dataset. This leaves us with 41 sectors at the two-digit level,
133 sectors at the three-digit level, and 242 sectors at the four-digit level.
23For a detailed description of the data on municipal taxes and other municipal attributes, see Brülhart and
Jametti (2006).
24Due to the small size of our sample jurisdictions, we feel condent in abstracting from within-juristictional
heterogeneity. Duranton, Gobillon and Overman (2007) provide a careful treatment of this issue based on data
for English Local Authorities (which, on average, cover areas that are 18 times larger than our Swiss sample
municipalities).
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4.3 Variables used
4.3.1 Dependent variable
We run all of our regressions for two waves of rm creations, which we pool while allowing
for separate intercepts. Counts of new rms set up over the period 1999-2000 are assigned
to control variables for 1998, and counts of new rms set up over the period 2001-2002 are
assigned to control variables for 2001. The average number of new rms (nij) at the three-
digit level is 0.486 and 0.440 in our two sample periods respectively. By multiplying these
averages with the number of sector-municipality observations in each sample period, we nd
nationwide totals of 13,768 new rms in 1999-2000 and 12,465 new rms in 2001-2002.
4.3.2 Explanatory variables: baseline model
Our main explanatory variables in the baseline model (2) are local corporate taxes (Tj), sec-
toral agglomeration economies (Ai) and, most importantly, the interaction of those two e¤ects.
We represent local corporate taxes via a tax index, a revenue-weighted average of consolidated
municipal and cantonal prot and capital taxes. The index is calculated separately for 1998
and for 2001. Corporate income tax schedules are progressive in most municipalities. Hence,
we collected statutory corporate income tax rates for three representative levels of protability
(2, 9 and 32 percent, based on observed distributions of protability levels in Swiss rm-level
statistics), and took the mean of these three rates as an index for the corporate income tax.
As capital taxes are generally proportional, we collected statutory capital tax rates for a rm
with the median capital base. To compute the tax index, we normalized the prot-tax index
and the capital tax rates by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation for
each of the two sample years, and we weighted them by the respective importance in terms
of tax revenue. Hence, the tax index has mean zero by construction.25
Agglomeration economies are not directly observable. In steady state, however, sectors
subject to strong agglomeration economies will be more spatially concentrated than sectors
subject to weak agglomeration economies (or to net dispersion economies). Hence, we compute
spatial concentration indices using the denition proposed by Ellison and Glaeser (1997),
which controls for di¤erences in rm numbers across sectors in quantifying the extent of
25Table 1 provides summary statistics, and Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of tax indices across cantons.
None of our results hinges on the construction of this variable. Results for our baseline model using statutory
tax rates instead of the tax index can be provided on request.
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geographic clustering. We refer to this variable as the EG index. We cannot estimate the
main e¤ect of the EG index, due to the inclusion of sector-specic xed e¤ects. Our coe¢ cient
of interest in the baseline model (2), however, is 3, the e¤ect of the interaction between the
tax index and the EG index. We compute this interaction by multiplying the two indices after
mean-di¤erencing the EG index (the tax index has mean zero by construction). Thereby, the
interaction term has a mean of zero, which allows us to interpret the estimated coe¢ cient on
the tax index as the e¤ect of taxes for a sector with average spatial concentration.
A number of control variables are included (xij). In order to allow for cost factors a¤ecting
rm prots, we control for the prices of labour and of real estate.26 Wage reports average
monthly wages per sector and region, while property price stands for the average selling price
of a representative family home.27 In the baseline model, we interact both these price variables
with the EG index, as we may expect equivalent e¤ects of agglomeration economies for the
importance of factor prices to those we hypothesize for local tax rates: the stronger are sector-
specic agglomeration economies, the less sensitive rmslocation decisions should be, other
things equal, to di¤erentials in factor prices across municipalities.
As income taxes may a¤ect rmslocation choices in addition to corporate taxes, we also
include the variable income tax, which represents the canton-averaged statutory cantonal-
plus-municipal income tax rate for a median-income representative household. We choose
this measure, which is invariant across municipalities within each canton, because distances
within cantons are su¢ ciently small to allow easy commuting among municipalities. Hence,
income taxes in the particular municipalities where rms are located would not be the rel-
evant measure.28 Similarly, we control for public expenditure, computed as canton-averaged
municipal-plus-cantonal expenditures on what might be considered the main spending items
from the viewpoint of private-sector rms: education, public safety and transport. Again,
selecting only municipality-specic expenditure would not represent the relevant variable, as
26We assume that the price of capital is equalized across Swiss municipalities.
27Wage is available from the Swiss national statistical o¢ ce for the year 2000, at a level of sectoral ag-
gregation corresponding roughly to one-digit NACE, and at the level of regions comprising several cantons
(Grossregionen). It is thus assumed that relative wages are constant over our sample period, among sub-
sectors and within regions. Property price is available from the consultancy rm Wüest & Partner for the
year 2002. It is assumed that relative property prices did not vary signicantly over our sample period. Since
commercial property prices are not collected at a su¢ cient level of detail for our purpose, we employ prices of
private property as the best approximation.
28We have also performed our estimations by replacing the canton-averaged tax rate on a median-income
household by (i) the municipal median-income tax rate, (ii) the canton-mean maximum (i.e. high-income)
tax rate, and (iii) inversely distance weighted averages of municipal tax rates. All our qualitative results are
una¤ected by variations in the denition of income tax.
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Swiss municipalities are su¢ ciently small to commute to from outside.29
Proximity to same-sector rms is the key cost factor stressed in the recent economic geog-
raphy literature - either as a source of technological spillovers, specialized production factors
and intermediate inputs, or as factor a¤ecting the intensity of local competition. We therefore
control for sector proximity, by computing separately for each municipality and for 1998 and
2001 the inversely distance weighted number of existing rms in the relevant sector across
all Swiss municipalities. The main demand-side control variable is market potential, which,
for each municipality, is dened in the conventional way as the inversely distance weighted
average income across all Swiss municipalities.30 As a simple complementary measure, we
also include distance to highway, the road distance to the nearest access point to the highway
network. This variable, unlike sector proximity and market potential, has the advantage of
measuring accessibility without implying that the relevant economic space ends at the national
border. Summary statistics on these variables are provided in Table 1. We furthermore in-
clude a dummy variable for assisted municipalities, which are dened as lying within a region
identied by federal law as eligible for temporary tax exemptions for newly created rms.31
Finally, we control for area, for consistent estimation given unequally sized locations (see
Section 3.3.1). In dening this variable, we consider only built-up and constructible surfaces.
4.3.3 Explanatory variables: specic model
Estimation of our specic model (5) requires a subset of the variables used in the baseline
model, measured in logs. An important di¤erence is that we need to identify the relevant
tax rates. We have therefore collected statutory tax rates on representative tax payers for
taxes on corporate income (tj ), capital (t
k
j ) and personal income (t
w
j ).
32 Since these statutory
29Using a broader measure of public expenditure does not a¤ect any of our qualitative results but leads to
somewhat weaker e¤ects of the expenditure variable.
30 In the construction of these two variables, we weight by the square of euclidian distance between the
geographic centers of municipalities. Square weights appear more appropriate than linear weights, considering
the existing evidence on spatial decay functions based on intra-national commuting patterns (e.g. Harsmann
and Quigley, 1998). Municipal incomes are estimates reported by the Swiss federal statistical o¢ ce for 1992,
the latest available year.
31According to Swiss law, some (mainly industrial) rms can be o¤ered tax rebates for a maximum of ten
years after setting up an operation. No data are made available for cantonal and municipal exemptions granted,
but it is probable that they are correlated with the eligibility for tax holidays at the federal level. Furthermore,
rules governing such practices are co-ordinated across cantons, such that they are unlikely to add signicantly
to di¤erences in scal burdens across jurisdictions.
32Based on scal statistics for Switzerland, we dene representative protability as 9 percent of own capital,
we take a representative capital stock as 176,000 and 181,000 Swiss francs respectively in 1998 and 2001, and
we consider canton-averaged income tax rates on a household with two children and a taxable annual income
of 73,000 and 75,000 Swiss francs respectively in 1998 and 2001. One Swiss franc traded for 0.63 US dollars
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tax rates may be sensitive to our denition of representative tax payers, we also estimate the
specic model using the tax index described above instead of the statutory rates.
5 Results
5.1 Some Preliminary Illustrations
Before reporting econometric estimates, we provide some illustrative examples of our cen-
tral result. Figures 3, 5 and 7 show maps of the geographic distribution of establishments
in three sectors: software development and consulting (NACE 722), production of clothing
(NACE 182), and brokerage and wealth management (NACE 671). These sectors are shown
in increasing order of their measured geographic concentration, the rst two sectors having
below-average EG indices, and the third sector displaying an EG index above the overall av-
erage of 0.013. The corresponding Figures 4, 6 and 8 plot counts of new rms, scaled by area,
in 1999-2000 over the 1998 tax index of all municipalities that have witnessed rm births over
the relevant period. We observe that the relationship between taxes and rm births becomes
gradually less negative as we move down the list of sectors. While the relationship between
taxes and rm births is negative and statistically signicant at the 1 percent level for soft-
ware development and consulting, this relationship turns positive, although not statistically
signicant, for brokerage and wealth management. These examples illustrate our main point:
the more spatially concentrated a sector, the less rm births in that sector are deterred by
high local corporate taxes (or attracted by low taxes).
5.2 Baseline Model
5.2.1 Parameter estimates with sector xed e¤ects
We begin by estimating our baseline model including xed e¤ects for sectors but not for mu-
nicipalities, which allows us to identify coe¢ cients on municipality-specic variables. The
rst panel of Table 2 reports estimates of specication (2) separately for the three levels of
sectoral aggregation distinguished in our data. To jump straight to the main result, focus-
ing on the 3-digit and 4-digit regression runs: while, as expected, the coe¢ cient on the tax
index is statistically signicantly negative, the interaction term with the EG index is statis-
on average over our sample period.
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tically signicantly positive. These estimations therefore conrm the hypothesis we seek to
test: location choices of rms in more spatially concentrated sectors are less sensitive to tax
di¤erentials.
The estimated coe¢ cients on the included control variables largely conform with expecta-
tions. We nd consistently negative coe¢ cients on wage and distance to highway, and positive
coe¢ cients on public expenditure, area, sector proximity and market potential.33 Interactions
of wage and property price with the EG index, reecting the prediction that rmssensitiv-
ity to factor prices other than taxes is also lessened as they experience stronger co-location
economies, return positive estimated coe¢ cients, in line with expectations.
The only unexpected result is that property price appears to a¤ect the rate of rm creation
positively. The most plausible explanation for this result is that property price correlates with
unobserved location-specic features that are attractive to new rms but not fully capitalized
in property prices. We therefore interpret this result as suggesting omitted variables at the
municipality level, which supports our use of alternative estimation strategies that involve the
inclusion of municipality-level xed e¤ects.
As a complement to the Poisson estimates we report results of specication (2) based on a
zero-inated Poisson model in the second panel of Table 2. The results are not substantially
a¤ected by this change of estimator. Our main coe¢ cients of interest, on the tax index and
on the interaction of the tax index with the EG index, have similar magnitudes across the two
sets of results, and the signs are identical throughout.
5.2.2 Parameter estimates with sector and location xed e¤ects
Table 3 presents estimation results for specication (7) of the baseline model, which includes
municipality xed e¤ects in addition to the sector xed e¤ects. The inclusion of municipality-
specic e¤ects implies that we can no longer identify the coe¢ cients on variables that do not
vary across sectors (tax index, property price, income tax, public expenditure, area, market
potential, distance to highway). Any bias due to unobserved but relevant time and sector
33We have also experimented with variables capturing municipality-level human capital (measured by average
educational attainment). Educational attainment turns out to be strongly collinear with market potential, and
inclusion of human-capital variables can yield negative estimated coe¢ cients on market potential. This is
consistent with models in which centrality (generally implying location in an urban area) is attractive mainly
because of the access it o¤ers to a skilled workforce and in spite of local congestion diseconomies (see, e.g.,
Combes, Duranton and Gobillon, 2008). None of the remaining coe¢ cients are signicantly a¤ected when
human capital is included. Results can be provided on request.
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invariant locational features, however, can now be avoided.34
Our main interest concerns the interaction of the tax index with the EG index. The
estimated coe¢ cients are somewhat smaller in magnitude, but they are again consistently
positive; and, based on the robust variance estimators, statistical signicance is found in two
out of the three regression runs. Our key result is thus conrmed: the more agglomerated a
sector, the less its rms react to tax di¤erentials in choosing locations.
In line with expectations, signicantly positive e¤ects are also found on the interaction
of property price with the EG index, and on sector proximity. Neither the main e¤ect of
wage nor its interaction with the EG index, however, is statistically signicant. This is not
very surprising, as we observe wages only at the level of large regions and not of individual
municipalities.
5.2.3 Importance of agglomeration on rmssensitivity to tax di¤erentials
The coe¢ cients reported in the rst panel of Table 2 reveal that for a rm in a sector with
an EG index of zero, corporate taxes exert a statistically signicantly negative impact on
location choice. We can quantify this e¤ect by computing the relative change in new rm
counts of a one-standard-deviation change in the tax index (see e.g. Winkelmann, 2000):
E (nij jTj + 1  std(Tj))  E (nij jTj)
E (nij jTj) = exp ((b2 + b3Ai)  std(Tj))  1:
The estimated parameters at the three-digit level, for example, imply that an increase in
a municipalitys tax index by one sample standard deviation (of 0.64) decreases the count of
rms in a sector with average agglomeration intensity (EG index of 0.013) setting up in that
municipality by 3.8 percent.
For a weakly agglomerated sector, at the twentieth percentile of the sample distribution
of the EG index, the tax deterrent e¤ect is considerably stronger, at -6.7 percent. Conversely,
at the eightieth percentile of the distribution of the EG index, the impact of a one-standard-
deviation increase in the tax index on the count of new rms shrinks to -3.3 percent. Hence,
location choices of rms in sectors with an agglomeration intensity at the twentieth percentile
of the sample distribution are twice as responsive to a given change in municipal corporate
tax burdens as rms in sectors with an agglomeration intensity at the eightieth percentile
34One such feature might be the bureaucratic costs of registering a new rm.
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of the sample distribution. To give two examples, rms in the software sector (NACE 722),
whose EG index corresponds to the twentieth percentile, are predicted to be twice as sensitive
to corporate tax di¤erentials as rms in the specialized machinery sector (NACE 295), whose
EG index corresponds to the eightieth percentile. Our results therefore imply di¤erences in
locational sensitivities that are quantitatively important.35
5.3 Specic model
5.3.1 Parameter estimates
The rst panel of Table 4 reports our estimates of the specic model (5), with all coe¢ cients
constrained to be equal across sectors (allowing us to report them in the table). Again, we
nd that high corporate taxes deter rm births, with an e¤ect of the corporate income tax
rate that is statistically signicantly negative across the three regression runs. Note that the
positive coe¢ cient estimated on ln(1-tj ) implies that the e¤ect of the tax rate is negative.
The e¤ects of income tax and capital tax are also estimated to be negative. The e¤ect of
capital taxes appears considerably weaker than that of corporate and personal income taxes.
This can probably be explained by the fact that capital taxes play a relatively minor role
in the Swiss scal system, accounting for a mere three percent of consolidated tax revenues
at the sub-federal level (whereas corporate income taxes represent some twelve percent and
personal income taxes about two thirds of total sub-federal revenues).
Conversely, agglomeration e¤ects, measured here as the coe¢ cient on the interaction be-
tween sector proximity and the EG index, are positive and statistically signicant (although
with robust standard errors statistical signicance is found only at the three-digit level of
sectoral aggregation). The remaining controls perform in line with expectations: a large area,
high sector proximity and high market potential raise the number of new rms, while a high
average wage appears to be detrimental. The estimated coe¢ cients on property price are
not statistically signicant, which is again suggestive of a dual role played by this variable,
both as a factor price (which deters rm births) and as a positive but imperfect correlate of
unmeasured locational attractions (which promote rm births), thus supporting inclusion of
35At the ninetieth percentile of the distribution of the EG index, the implied e¤ect of corporate taxes is still
negative. It is only when we move to the 95th percentile, i.e. for rms in a very strongly agglomerated sector,
that the estimates imply a positive relation between the tax index and new rm counts (of 7.4 percent). Our
results therefore suggest, in accordance with expectations, that high corporate taxes are a deterrent to rm
location in well over 90 percent of sectors.
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municipality xed e¤ects to test the sensitivity of our parameters of main interest.
We then carry out a number of robustness tests on the regressions reported in the rst
panel of Table 4.
In the second panel of Table 4, we show results for the same specication but estimated via
zero-inated Poisson. The estimated coe¢ cients are stable, and the precision of the estimates
is increased. In particular, we now nd that the interaction between sector proximity and the
EG index is statistically signicant at all levels of sectoral aggregation also when based on
robust standard errors. Overall, therefore, even the constrained version of our specic model
(in the sense that estimated coe¢ cients are forced to be equal across sectors) performs well.
The rst panel of Table 5 reports estimates of a specication that allows for sector-specic
coe¢ cients on wage, property price and market potential and thereby gets closer to expression
(5).36 Once more, our main results stand: high corporate and personal income taxes depress
rm births, whereas rms in highly agglomerated sectors, measured by the EG index, choose
locations with high sector proximity. Our qualitative results also hold once we force the
coe¢ cients on area to unity, as suggested by the empirical model in Section 3.3.1. These
estimates are reported in the second panel of Table 5.37
As another robustness test, we again introduce municipality xed e¤ects. This no longer
allows us to identify the e¤ect of the tax variables, but it serves as a check on the interaction
between sector proximity and the EG index in a specication that controls for all potential
municipality-level determinants of rm births. Table 6 displays the results. We once more nd
positive estimates on the interaction of interest, with robust statistical signicance, however,
found only at the three-digit level of sectoral aggregation.
Finally, we replace our statutory corporate tax variables with the tax index for corporate
income and capital taxes as used in the baseline model. To use the tax index, while loosening
the link to the specic model, has the advantage of capturing the full tax schedules better
than statutory taxes for particular types of rms and households. These results are reported
in Table 7 (which apart from the modied tax variables corresponds to the specication
reported on in Table 4). We nd statistically signicant deterrent e¤ects of corporate and
36We report results for interactions of these three variables with dummies for one-digit sectors. Due to space
constraints, we report test statistics for the joint signicance of each set of coe¢ cients rather than listing all
the individual estimates. Interactions with dummies for more disaggregated sectors do not substantially alter
our results. We have also found our ndings to be robust to sector-by-sector estimation of the tax variables.
37We furthermore nd the results not to be substantively a¤ected if instead of Poisson we employ the zero-
inated Poisson estimator for these regression runs.
20
personal income taxes across the board. All remaining coe¢ cients, including those on the
agglomeration variables, are very similar to those obtained in the estimations based on the
tax index (Table 4). We therefore conclude that our results are not driven by any particular
- and inevitably somewhat arbitrary - empirical representation of the relevant corporate and
personal tax burdens.
5.3.2 Tax-versus-agglomeration e¤ect
Our specic model implies that the elasticity of prots, and thus of new rm counts, with
respect to corporate income taxes is constant. Hence, unlike our baseline specication (1), the
specic model (5) does not feature an explicit interaction between taxes and agglomeration
forces. However, the agglomeration force, i.e. the e¤ect on prots of a large Nij , will be
sector specic. According to equation (5), the total agglomeration e¤ect on prots is @ lni@ lnNi =
7+8 Ai, which varies across sectors via the di¤erent agglomeration intensities Ai.
38 Having
estimated the parameters of equation (5), we will thus be able to compute how the sensitivity
of prots with respect to the local corporate tax index (2) varies relative to the elasticity of
prot with respect to the number of proximate own-sector rms:
Tax-Versus-Agglomeration E¤ect =
b2b7 + b8Ai ;
where circumexes denote estimated values.
An illustration of this e¤ect, based on the three-digit unconstrained Poisson results of
Table 5, is provided in Figure 9. Condence intervals are computed using the delta method,
based alternatively on unadjusted and on robust Poisson standard errors. The illustration
shows that the relative importance of tax di¤erentials is some 2.5 times stronger for the least
agglomerated sectors than for the most agglomerated sectors.39 We again nd, therefore, that
the intensity of agglomeration a¤ects the relative importance of tax di¤erentials in determining
rmslocation choices to a quantitatively signicant extent.
38Recall that we constrain 7i; and 8i in (5) to be equal across sectors, as our data would not allow us to
identify them separately at the sector level.
39The EG index in our sample ranges from -0.050 to 0.279 (see Table 1).
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6 Conclusions
Drawing on a rm-level dataset for Switzerland and employing xed-e¤ects count-data estima-
tion techniques, we nd that rm births on average react negatively to corporate tax burdens,
but that the deterrent e¤ect of taxes is signicantly weaker in sectors that are more spatially
concentrated. This nding supports the validity of recent theoretical results suggesting that
agglomeration economies can reduce the importance of tax di¤erentials for rms location
choices and thereby lessen the intensity of corporate tax competition even if technological and
administrative barriers to capital mobility are low.
In a sense, this research constitutes but the rst step in a full evaluation of the prediction
that agglomeration forces mitigate race-to-the-bottomtax competition. Although tax com-
petition is often at its ercest when targeted at new rms, it could be useful to explore how
tax di¤erentials a¤ect not just births but the entire life cycle of rms, including expansions,
contractions and deaths. In future work it will furthermore be interesting to study whether
policy makers recognize the di¤erential impact of scal inducements across sectors and e¤ec-
tively tax agglomeration rents, and whether this e¤ect is strong enough to have a noticeable
impact on the evolution of statutory corporate tax burdens.
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Figure 1: Profit Tax Rates Across Swiss Cantons 
 
Notes: Cantonal and municipal statutory profit tax rates on a representative firm with 2% 
return on capital. Cantonal averages over all of the canton’s sample municipalities in 1998. 
Blue areas are lakes. 
 
Figure 2: Corporate Tax Burdens (Tax Index) Across Swiss Cantons 
 
Notes: See data section for a description of the tax index. Cantonal averages over all of the 
canton’s sample municipalities in 1998. Blue areas are lakes. 
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Figure 3: Software Development and Consulting (Distribution of Firms in 1998) 
(EG index = 0.002) 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Software Development and Consulting (Taxes and New Firms, 1999-2000) 
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Notes: slope = -4.80; t-stat = -2.68; R2 = 0.039 
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Figure 5: Production of Clothing (Distribution of Firms in 1998) 
(EG index = 0.008) 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Production of Clothing (Taxes and New Firms, 1999-2000) 
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Notes: slope = -0.24; t-stat = -0.58; R2 = 0.021 
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Figure 7: Brokerage and Wealth Management (Distribution of Firms in 1998) 
(EG index = 0.079) 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Brokerage and Wealth Management (Taxes and New Firms, 1999-2000) 
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Notes: slope = 0.91; t-stat = 1.14; R2 = 0.030 
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Figure 9: Tax-Versus-Agglomeration Effect 
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Notes:  The graph illustrates the relative effect of taxes compared to the impact of supplier access as a 
function of the degree of agglomeration at the NACE three-digit sector level. The underlying 
computations are based on the coefficients in Table 5.
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 Varies by Mean Std. Dev. Min. Mun./sector with min. Max. Mun./sector with max.
New firms1 mun., sector 0.486 4.245 0 several 371
Zurich (ZH), legal and 
management consultancy 
services
Tax index mun. 0.000 0.641 -1.81 Zug (ZG) 2.04 Giubiasco (TI)
Corporate income tax2 mun. 10.681 2.167 5.45 Baar (ZG) 18.39 Giubiasco (TI)
EG index sector 0.013 0.031 -0.05 production of paints & printing inks 0.23 scheduled air travel
Wage3 mun., sector 6.000 0.771 3.38 several 7.77 several
Property price4 mun. 180.3 29.0 111.0 Le Locle (NE) 268.0 Zollikon (ZH)
Capital tax2 mun. 0.437 0.114 0.19 Stans (NW) 0.79 Liestal (BL)
Income tax2 mun. 6.704 1.442 2.96 Baar (ZG) 9.38 Le Locle (NE)
Public spending5 mun. 5.504 0.898 3.95 Appenzell (AI) 9.00 Altdorf (UR)
Sector proximity mun., sector 64.78 181.86 0.01
Chiasso (TI), 
reproduction of 
recording media
6133.20 Geneva (GE), banks
Market potential6 mun. 1.140 0.629 0.03 Davos (GR) 4.39 Ecublens (VD)
Distance to highway7 mun. 4.349 6.530 0.03 Morges (VD) 59.92 St. Moritz (GR)
Assisted municipalities mun. 0.249 0.432 0 several 1 several
Area mun. 422.8 454.9 73.0 Massagno (TI) 5,346 Zürich (ZH)
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
NACE 3-digit sector level, year 1998, 28,329 observations
Notes : 1 over period 1999-2000, 2 in percent, 3 in 2000 in thousand, 4 in 2002, 5 per capita in thousand, 6 based on 1992 municipal
incomes in million CHF, 7 in kilometers,.
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NACE sectors:   2 digit 3 digit 4 digit 2 digit 3 digit 4 digit
Tax index -0.066 -0.114 -0.096 -0.063 -0.125 -0.102
(0.017)*** (0.012)*** (0.011)*** (0.018)*** (0.013)*** (0.012)***
(0.07) (0.047)** (0.036)*** (0.069)* (0.050)** (0.038)***
Tax index * EG index 7.521 4.089 4.523 7.148 3.964 4.315
(1.354)*** (0.766)*** (0.603)*** (1.485)*** (0.818)*** (0.621)***
(4.882) (2.072)** (1.928)** (4.763) (3.047) (1.954)**
Wage -0.619 -0.644 -0.698 -0.656 -0.679 -0.744
(0.025)*** (0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.027)*** (0.023)*** (0.023)***
(0.065)*** (0.078)*** (0.070)*** (0.090)*** (0.070)*** (0.056)***
Wage * EG index 0.006 0.007 0.003 0.006 0.008 0.003
(0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
(0.005) (0.002)*** (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)*** (0.002)**
Property price 0.671 0.500 0.437 0.450 0.255 0.175
(0.050)*** (0.042)*** (0.041)*** (0.057)*** (0.050)*** (0.052)***
(0.190)*** (0.131)*** (0.101)*** (0.156)*** (0.118)** (0.110)
Property price * EG index 0.156 0.116 0.103 -0.011 0.033 0.033
(0.031)*** (0.016)*** (0.013)*** (0.036) (0.019)* (0.015)**
(0.102) (0.047)** (0.044)** (0.068) (0.036) (0.024)
Income tax -0.031 -0.033 -0.037 -0.031 -0.040 -0.050
(0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)***
(0.015)** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.025) (0.019)** (0.017)***
Public expenditure 0.168 0.172 0.175 0.180 0.180 0.180
(0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.010)*** (0.011)***
(0.014)*** (0.010)*** (0.012)*** (0.033)*** (0.026)*** (0.024)***
Sector proximity 0.236 0.486 0.599 0.241 0.456 0.500
(0.006)*** (0.012)*** (0.015)*** (0.006)*** (0.013)*** (0.017)***
(0.047)*** (0.048)*** (0.106)*** (0.035)*** (0.072)*** (0.093)***
Market potential 0.228 0.344 0.421 0.187 0.385 0.493
(0.014)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.016)*** (0.015)*** (0.014)***
(0.102)** (0.041)*** (0.031)*** (0.058)*** (0.051)*** (0.042)***
Distance to highway -0.028 -0.028 -0.028 -0.027 -0.025 -0.024
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 0.002 (0.002)***
(0.005)*** (0.004)**** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
Assisted municipalities -0.179 -0.202 -0.223 -0.198 -0.222 -0.264
(0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.022)*** (0.023)*** (0.025)*** (0.026)***
(0.039)*** (0.042)*** (0.040)*** (0.070)*** (0.059)*** (0.050)***
Area 0.646 0.654 0.661 0.629 0.609 0.584
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)***
(0.010)*** (0.010)**** (0.007)*** (0.017)*** (0.013)*** (0.012)***
Dummy for 2001 -0.119 -0.122 -0.101 -0.108 -0.098 -0.073
(0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)***
(0.043)*** (0.029)*** (0.030)*** (0.052)** (0.039)** (0.037)**
Log likelihood -18,208 -28,406 -36,481 -17,526 -27,192 -34,869
No. of sectors 41 133 242 41 133 242
No. of observations 17,261 55,993 101,669 17,261 55,993 101,669
Notes : * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; standard errors in parentheses; robust standard errors in parentheses and italics.
Table 2: Baseline Model, Sector Fixed Effects
Dependent variable = Number of new firms per municipality and sector
Zero-Inflated PoissonPoisson
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NACE sectors: 2 digit 3 digit 4 digit
Tax index * EG index 3.377 3.134 2.601
(1.036)*** (0.640)*** (0.483)***
(2.451) (1.134)*** (0.981)***
Wage 0.001 0.002 -0.013
0.035 0.035 (0.035)*
(0.126) (0.092) (0.071)
Wage * EG index -0.003 0.002 0.001
0.002 (0.001)* (0.001)*
(0.005) (0.002) (0.001)
Property price * EG index 0.191 0.171 0.121
(0.031)*** (0.017)*** (0.013)***
(0.108)* (0.055)*** (0.055)**
Sector proximity 0.099 0.228 0.538
(0.008)*** (0.015)*** (0.027)***
(0.027)*** (0.049)*** (0.061)***
Dummy for 2001 -0.133 -0.138 -0.137
(0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)***
(0.030)*** (0.028)*** (0.028)***
Log likelihood -12,829 -22,988 -30,805
No. of sectors 41 133 242
No. of observations 17,261 55,993 101,669
Table 3: Baseline Model, Sector and Location Fixed Effects
Poisson Estimation
Notes : * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; standard errors in parentheses; robust 
standard errors in parentheses and italics.
Dependent variable = Number of new firms per municipality and sector
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NACE sectors:   2 digit 3 digit 4 digit 2 digit 3 digit 4 digit
Log (1 - corporate income tax) 1.539 1.468 1.314 1.427 1.587 1.437
(0.232)*** (0.232)*** (0.233)*** (0.242)*** (0.250)*** (0.263)***
(0.706)** (0.593)*** (0.478)*** (0.745)* (0.584)*** (0.513)***
Log wage -3.516 -3.520 -3.594 -3.665 -3.565 -3.636
(0.117)*** (0.117)*** (0.118)*** (0.122)*** (0.121)*** (0.123)***
(0.364)*** (0.307)*** (0.283)*** (0.301)*** (0.212)*** (0.189)***
Log property price 0.066 0.024 -0.061 0.065 -0.022 -0.108
(0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.081) (0.084) (0.088)
(0.284) (0.212) (0.175) (0.153) (0.129) (0.122)
Log (1 + capital tax) -0.189 -0.141 -0.092 -0.160 -0.110 -0.127
(0.078)** (0.078)* (0.079) (0.082)* -0.087 -0.091
(0.102)* (0.091) (0.099) (0.166) (0.145) -(0.132)
Log (1 + income tax) -1.133 -1.129 -1.135 -1.162 -1.157 -1.151
(0.035)*** (0.035)*** (0.036)*** (0.037)*** (0.039)*** (0.040)***
(0.098)*** (0.074)*** (0.068)*** (0.112)*** (0.089)*** (0.078)***
Log sector proximity 0.575 0.517 0.493 0.569 0.501 0.470
(0.013)*** (0.010)*** (0.009)*** (0.013)*** (0.011)*** (0.010)***
(0.054)*** (0.033)*** (0.025)*** (0.027)*** (0.018)*** (0.016)***
Log (sector proximity) * EG index 1.461 2.173 1.034 2.318 2.389 1.220
(0.542)*** (0.277)*** (0.195)*** (0.585)*** (0.284)*** (0.197)***
(1.881) (1.188)* (0.908) (1.064)** (0.566)*** (0.380)***
Log market potential 0.215 0.297 0.335 0.250 0.387 0.459
(0.027)*** (0.025)*** (0.023)*** (0.028)*** (0.027)*** (0.027)***
(0.098)** (0.062)*** (0.048)*** (0.059)*** (0.044)*** (0.040)***
Log area 1.134 1.132 1.136 1.119 1.097 1.080
(0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)***
(0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.015)*** (0.013)*** (0.014)***
Dummy for 2001 -0.220 -0.219 -0.205 -0.216 -0.201 -0.183
(0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.015)***
(0.035)*** (0.033)*** (0.029)*** (0.032)*** (0.026)*** (0.025)***
Log likelihood -13,906 -23,795 -31,485 -13,971 -24,018 -31,876
No. of sectors 41 133 242 41 133 242
No. of observations 17,261 55,993 101,669 17,261 55,993 101,669
Zero-Inflated Poisson
Table 4: Specific Model, Sector Fixed Effects, Statutory Tax Rates
Dependent variable = number of new firms per municipality and sector
Notes : * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; standard errors in parentheses; robust standard errors in parentheses and italics.
Poisson
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NACE sectors:   2 digit 3 digit 4 digit 2 digit 3 digit 4 digit
Log (1 - corporate income tax) 1.451 1.388 1.272 0.730 0.650 0.503
(0.233)*** (0.233)*** (0.233)*** (0.227)*** (0.227)*** (0.227)**
(0.690)** (0.578)** (0.467)*** (0.635) (0.553) (0.391)
Log (1 + capital tax) -0.127 -0.081 -0.024 -0.242 -0.196 -0.140
(0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.077)*** (0.077)** (0.078)*
(0.086) (0.084) -(0.097) (0.071)*** (0.079)** (0.101)
Log (1 + income tax) -1.153 -1.146 -1.151 -0.996 -0.994 -0.996
(0.036)*** (0.036)*** (0.036)*** (0.034)*** (0.034)*** (0.034)***
(0.115)*** (0.078)*** (0.070)*** (0.151)*** (0.060)*** (0.053)***
Log sector proximity 0.503 0.475 0.456 0.537 0.499 0.474
(0.013)*** (0.011)*** (0.009)*** (0.013)*** (0.010)*** (0.009)***
(0.047)*** (0.031)*** (0.024)*** (0.063)*** (0.038)*** (0.026)***
Log (sector proximity) * EG index 0.128 1.975 0.827 -0.022 1.856 0.794
(0.579) (0.294)*** (0.198)*** (0.570) (0.292)*** (0.197)***
(1.073) (1.062)* (0.737) (1.525) (1.111)* (1.264)
Log area 1.135 1.132 1.135 1.000 1.000 1.000
(0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** - - -
(0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.011)*** - - -
Dummy for 2001 -0.207 -0.210 -0.196 -0.221 -0.222 -0.208
(0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)***
(0.033)*** (0.031)*** (0.028)*** (0.040)*** (0.028)*** (0.028)***
Log likelihood -13,707 -23,592 -31,272 -13,891 -23,770 -31,459
Chi2-stat Sector dummies * Wage 551.66 15.86 32.81 687.76 16.54 29.31
Chi2-stat Sector dummies * Property price 1,203.53 52.95 108.34 764.83 54.29 110.44
Chi2-stat Sector dummies * Market potential 871.07 27.56 18.63 1,137.80 25.80 17.27
No. of sectors 41 133 242 41 133 242
No. of observations 17,261 55,993 101,669 17,261 55,993 101,669
Constrained Poisson
Notes : * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; standard errors in parentheses; robust standard errors in parentheses and italics for Poisson model; 
bootstrapped standard error were used to calculate Chi2-stat; bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses and italics for constrained 
Poisson. Coefficient on log area constrained to one in constrained regressions.
Table 5: Specific Model, Sector Fixed Effects, Sector-Level Coefficients, Statutory Tax Rates
Dependent variable = number of new firms per municipality and sector
Poisson
 
 
 
NACE sectors:   2 digit 3 digit 4 digit
Log wage -1.004 -0.971 -0.873
(0.212)*** (0.214)*** (0.213)***
(0.523)* (0.396)** (0.327)***
Log sector proximity 0.560 0.476 0.452
(0.015)*** (0.012)*** (0.010)***
(0.052)*** (0.028)*** (0.023)***
Log (sector proximity) * EG index 0.772 1.997 0.885
0.538 (0.280)*** (0.191)***
(1.060) (0.751)*** (0.664)
Dummy for 2001 -0.200 -0.196 -0.185
(0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)***
(0.041)*** (0.032)*** (0.030)***
Log likelihood -12,267 -22,224 -29,918
No. of sectors 41 133 242
No. of observations 17,261 55,993 101,669
Table 6: Specific Model, Sector and Location Fixed Effects
Poisson estimation
Notes : * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; standard errors in parentheses; robust standard errors
in parentheses and italics.
Dependent variable = number of new firms per municipality and sector
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NACE sectors:   2 digit 3 digit 4 digit 2 digit 3 digit 4 digit
Tax index -0.102 -0.096 -0.087 -0.097 -0.101 -0.096
(0.001)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)***
(0.035)*** (0.029)*** (0.023)*** (0.032)*** (0.025)*** (0.022)***
Log wage -3.294 -3.291 -3.362 -3.424 -3.322 -3.412
(0.117)*** (0.117)*** (0.118)*** (0.121)*** (0.121)*** (0.122)***
(0.366)*** (0.304)*** (0.284)*** (0.302)*** (0.216)*** (0.190)***
Log property price -0.072 -0.114 -0.198 -0.079 -0.159 -0.250
(0.076) (0.076) (0.077)** (0.080) (0.084)* (0.087)***
(0.270) (0.200) (0.166) (0.151) (0.131) (0.126)**
Log income tax -0.945 -0.940 -0.945 -0.966 -0.947 -0.946
(0.029)*** (0.029)*** (0.029)*** (0.030)*** (0.031)*** (0.033)***
(0.080)*** (0.054)*** (0.055)*** (0.086)*** (0.070)*** (0.062)***
Log sector proximity 0.577 0.518 0.493 0.572 0.503 0.471
(0.013)*** (0.010)*** (0.009)*** (0.013)*** (0.011)*** (0.010)***
(0.055)*** (0.034)*** (0.025)*** (0.027)*** (0.018)*** (0.016)***
Log (sector proximity) * EG index 1.432 2.166 1.032 2.278 2.393 1.228
(0.542)*** (0.277)*** (0.195)*** (0.582)*** (0.284)*** (0.198)***
(1.876) (1.174)* (0.900) (1.051)** (0.559)*** (0.378)***
Log market potential 0.243 0.327 0.366 0.278 0.420 0.495
(0.027)*** (0.025)*** (0.024)*** (0.028)*** (0.027)*** (0.027)***
(0.103)** (0.065)*** (0.049)*** (0.058)*** (0.044)*** (0.040)***
Log area 1.142 1.139 1.142 1.126 1.105 1.088
(0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)***
(0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.012)*** (0.015)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)***
Dummy for 2001 -0.214 -0.215 -0.202 -0.211 -0.199 -0.180
(0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)***
(0.037)*** (0.033)*** (0.031)*** (0.032)*** (0.026)*** (0.025)***
Log likelihood -13,844 -23,736 -31,431 -13,914 -23,963 -31,827
No. of sectors 41 133 242 41 133 242
No. of observations 17,261 55,993 101,669 17,261 55,993 101,669
Notes : * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; standard errors in parentheses; robust standard errors in parentheses and italics.
Poisson
Table 7: Specific Model, Sector Fixed Effects, Tax Index
Dependent variable = number of new firms per municipality and sector
Zero-Inflated Poisson
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